Intelligence Brief on the Israel-Hamas crisis & its impact on India’s National Interest

 

This was first prepared as Group Project for the PGP-7 batch of Takshashila Institution, and submitted on 20^th November 2023 - a month into the direct military retaliation by Israel on Hamas and the Gaza strip, post the 7th October attack on Israeli kibbutz next to Gaza.

Key Context – History of the crisis, recent trigger points, and India’s stance & involvement over time

The ongoing battle today between Hamas in Gaza and the state Israel is more than a hundred years in the making. It can be divided into five phases for the better understanding of the crisis today (Staff G. , 2023) (Staff, 2023) (Westfall, Murphy, Taylor, Pietsch, & Salcedo, 2023)

1.       (1917-1938) The Balfour Declaration of 1917 was the official starting point for the demand of the state of Israel, and the start of Jewish immigration facilitated by a British Mandate from 1923 to 1948 in Palestine.

2.       (1939-1947) The subsequent holocaust and its excesses against the European Jews accelerated this process and culminated with the UN partition plan of 1947 which created the plan for a state of Israel.

·        Between the 1930s and 40s’, Mahatma Gandhi moved between positions of opposing a potential Israel state to stating that the Jews have a case to exist in Palestine, but should do it non-violently (Vanaik, 2021)

3.       (1948-1973) This started with the “Naqba” – the exile of Palestine in millions, and included series of wars between the Arab nations and the state of Israel in this time period

·        This was also the time when India had openly supported the cause of Palestine as part of its initial years of the anti-colonial struggle and the non-alignment movement (Subramanian, 2021).

·        Israel helped India with arms and ammunitions during India’s war in the region in 1962 and 1965, and this was the beginning of India’s behind-the-veil deals with Israel (Sharma, 2023).

4.       (1974-2004) This was a time of to and fro between the Intifada (the Palestinian uprising) to deep-rooted attempts at peace (including the Camp David and the Oslo peace accords which nearly formalised the two-state solution), with Yaseer Arafat as the main PLO protagonist.

·        India was the first Non-Arab State to recognize PLO as the representative of Palestine in 1974, and among the first countries to recognize the State of Palestine in 1988 (Staff M. , 2019).

·        The Gulf War and the Soviet collapse forced India to reconsider its stand and it established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, while continuing to support the two-state solution (Apte, 2021) (Suri, 2022).

5.       (2005-till date) Yaseer Arafat died in 2004, and in the 2005 Palestinian elections Hamas gained a majority, but, the subsequent Hamas-Fatah civil war led to the division of Palestine into two parts of West Bank and Gaza Strip. This was also the time of the rise of the right-wing politicians in Israel and Netanyahu being sworn in for a record sixth time, who increasingly side-stepped the two-state solution with increasing Israeli settlements in West Bank (Staff U. , 2023) (Schewe, 2021) .

·        We have, over time, moderated our strong stance against Israel, while condemning settler violence and killing of civilians in direct support of the non-violent Palestinian cause (Bhattacherjee, 2023).

The recent most trigger points for the Hamas’ attack on the Israeli kibbutz bordering the Gaza borders are multiple, a few of the critical ones with moderate to high confidence, can be ascertained to be the following -

·        A series of peace moves and economic deals between Israel and various middle-east nations (for eg. Abraham Accords and the near-ready Saudi Arabia-Israel deal), had put the Palestinian forces and the believers in an independent state of Palestine on the tenterhooks, due to the belief that their fight for autonomy would lose momentum. In addition, Iran too was interpreting these latest moves as it losing its sway over the region (Hamas), Lebanon (Hezbollah) and Yemen (Houthis). (Zeidan, 2023) (Saab, 2023) (Nakhoul, Mackenzie, Spetalnick, & Yaakoubi, 2023).

·        The recent skirmishes over the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in East Jerusalem, which followed the visit of a far-right Israeli government official Itamar Ben Gavir, to the location. This was very similar to the tension before the Second Intifada in late 2000, when then Likud party leader Ariel Sharon (not yet the PM), made a visit to the same mosque compound (Staff, 2023) (Gritten & Lukov, 2023) (Lynfield, 2023).

·        With Hamas voted to power, the Israeli soldiers and settlers left the Gaza strip in 2006. This led to the return of Israeli forces from the Gaza strip and a subsequent blockade the strip (with restrictions on external movements on land and sea from both sides of Israel and Egypt). This had led to Gaza being called an “open-air prison” by a UN expert on human rights in occupied territories (Staff R. , 2023).

Ramification of the current crisis on India’s national interests and our risk & opportunities connected to it

Our interest in the ongoing Israel-Hamas crisis can be summarised in the below main points of concerns -

·        Impact on trade interests via and in the middle-eastern region- The proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, announced during G20, also faces its first challenge with the armed conflict disrupting peace in the region (PTI, 2023). India is also a key economic partner in the I2U2 economic co-operation deal (between Israel, India, US, UAE) (Swain, 2023), which has an even chance of being affected by these latest developments. Prolonged war could also keep inflation high with surge in gold and crude prices, which is a risk we have to factor in our growth equations (Online, 2023).

·        Bilateral relations with the Gulf states - This gains prominence not just because of the high population of Indians (90 lakhs+) earning a living & having the highest remittances back into the country for any international cohort of Indian citizens, but, also for the trade in oil (50% of India’s oil imported from this region) & other resources that India and the Gulf nations are tied in (Alias, 2023). Importantly, India’s fourth largest trade partner today is Saudi Arabia (Explainers, 2023).  Although the Arab support for the Palestinian cause has watered down a bit in recent decades (Sengupta, 2023), India still cannot afford to side-step or dis-associate completely from the Palestinian cause. With the Belt & Road initiative becoming an important diplomatic and economic quiver in China’s armoury, India also cannot afford to see its relations with the Arab states suffer, as that could help China (with its support for Palestine) pull ahead for influence in the region (Jie, Ho, Yahya, & Haenle, 2023).

·        Strengthening ties with our western allies – With India’s relationship souring with Canada, increasing border skirmishes with China and its tacit economic-siding with Russia by buying more of its oil while the rest of the western nations have sanctioned it, puts India in a tough spot today. The need for balancing our relationship with allies like USA and UK becomes even more important now. But what could potentially turn out to be a risk if the war continues for a longer time and more civilians die; the likes of US, UK and Israel have a high likelihood of getting cornered in the international order (Khouri, Ramani, & Jeffrey, 2023) – and we must not be caught with the cornered nations while it happens. Hence, it is pragmatic to keep being flexible on this end, and seeing where the international wind is blowing.

·        Economic and defence ties with Israel - India has strong trade ties and investments in Israel. India’s defence relationship with Israel has only strengthened from the time of getting support from Israel for arms and ammunitions during our 1962 and 1965 wars, to receiving Mirage fighter jets and other arms from Israel during the Kargil War (Roy, 2023) (Sharma R. , 2023) (Kumaraswamy, 2016). Our bilateral relations have only strengthened since the historical first visit of an Indian President and PM to Israel in 2015 & 2017 respectively. We have a total of $10 bn in trade with Israel across agriculture, pharma, IT, telecom, water, chemicals and metals, and are recipients of 30% of Israel’s exports. Israel has now, in fact, become the one of the largest military partners to India, second only to Russia (IBEF, 2023).

·        De-hyphenation of ties with Israel & Palestine – India's relationship with Israel has evolved "from recognition to realization to unapologetic acceptance" (Bhat, 2023). If the Israel-Palestine conflict persists and becomes wider, as is suggestive from the increased skirmishes in West Bank; the likelihood of other middle-eastern nations at least covertly intervening in the war will become even higher (PTI, Times of India, 2023). Between 2016 to 2023, India has abstained from key UN votes to bring Israel to account for its excesses in Gaza. At the same time, India has also voted in favour of Palestine, voting against the Israeli settler colonies that continue to be built on demarcated Palestinian land. Maintaining this de-hyphenation through cautious prudence, will be critical to how we navigate this crisis (Pieal, 2023). This is also an opportunity for India to cement its legacy as a moderating voice of reason, in the region.

What ongoing interventions can change how the current crisis is playing out in the Israel-Palestine region

There are a few possibilities that can change the nature of the current inflict, and in decreasing order of likelihood, we are highlighting the same below –

1)       Key western allies of Israel like US and UK put their foot down against civilian deaths, and ask Israel to resort to immediate ceasefire (which will also satiate other Arab nations) and for Palestine to start releasing hostages (via intermediaries from Qatar, who have anyway helped in the first round of hostage release moves and is already in talks to assist with a deal for release of 50 more hostages (Mills & Hassan, 2023)). France has already spoken up against escalation of hostilities, and the UN General Assembly too has already passed a resolution calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

2)       The response of Iran and its supported-militia groups could play an important role. On 14 October, Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian warned that Iran could intervene in the war if the IDF launched a ground invasion of Gaza (Goksedef, 2023). With a ground invasion now underway by IDF, we cannot rule out the possibility that Iran supported militant groups like Hezbollah (from Lebanon) and the Houthis (from Yemen), could get more actively involved in attacking Israel from multiple fronts, which can complicate Israel’s defences even more and suck in more Western nation resources in preventing a wider escalation. This is evident from the minor skirmishes which continue at the Israel-Lebanon border and the rockets that were fired by the Houthis from their Yemen base (Tegler, 2023).

3)       If the other Arab countries decide to put an embargo on Israel for trade, military and diplomatic routes, which could also include an official fall of the Abraham Accords and a formal end to the ongoing Saudi Arabia-Israel deal for peace and co-operation. Middle-eastern oil producers also do not dominate the oil market today the same way they did in the 1970’s (Cohen, 2023). Although the possibility of this happening is remote, a lot will eventually depend on how the current ongoing hostilities simmer down rather than further escalate.

 

Potential scenarios, and their likelihood of occurrence in the near and medium term

The timing and sequencing of how the interventions in the ongoing crisis play out, would lead to possible scenarios. We assess that the most likely outcome of this conflict as the following: 

(Scenario 1) The quagmire begins (high confidence) - Israel enters Gaza and destroys the infrastructure of Hamas and takes indefinite military control. At the same time, West Bank status-quo continues. Israel continues expanding enclaves in West Bank, while Palestinians are put under tightened security in both regions. Short-term ceasefire is followed by periodical conflicts, while hostage negotiations and release continue as a protracted process (Lange & Spetalnick, 2023).

The four other likely scenarios are the following:

(Scenario 2) The quagmire deepens (moderate confidence) - Israel re-establishes enclaves in Gaza, in addition to the ones it has in West Bank. This leads to further escalation of tensions, and a high likelihood of another set of militia resistance forces that rise up from the ashes of what remains of Hamas in Gaza or even other migrant camp level militias in West Bank-based Jerusalem (Samrani, 2023). This is less likely in the near-term, but, is high likely in the medium-term, as the ground invasion of Gaza comes to a conclusion, and how the accuracy of assessments of the ground response becomes more clear.

(Scenario 3) The middle path (high confidence) - The Palestine Authority would be given control of Gaza, in addition to West Bank. Few recent statements by US envoy, Anothony Blinken supports this (Shear, 2023) - but Israel hasn't yet warmed up to the idea. The current right-wing in the Israel wants to annex West Bank and is tempted to do the same with the Gaza strip (Friedman, 2023). Hence, in the near-term this likelihood is low, but, in the medium-term could possibly be a middle ground that the Israelis accept, in the absence of embracing a two-state solution.

(Scenario 4) The fall of stability (moderate confidence) – Peace and co-operation alliances between Israel and other Arab nations breaks down. This is dependent on multiple factors such as for how long Israel will continue with its ground invasion, how citizen response to a protracted war in the middle-east will be perceived within the nations currently supporting Israel, how many more civilians will die as the outcome of this war and even how Iran and its supported militias will get further involved in this war (Samrani, 2023). We cannot rule out this possibility, but it is less likely to happen than other scenarios mentioned above.

(Scenario 5) The two-state solution (moderate confidence) – Israel gives back Gaza to a democratically elected Palestinian authority and takes back its 700,000 settlers from across Palestinian enclaves also in West Bank and signs off on a two-state agreement with Palestinian Authority. Ironically, this was the solution which seemed mostly likely during the Oslo peace accord process, and while Yitzhak Rabin, Yaseer Arafat & Bill Clinton were at the forefront of the negotiation process. But, with increasing doubts (not yet publicly announced as a formal position though) from the corridors of power not just in the UN, but also within Israel & Palestine itself (Ghosh, 2023). (Levy, 2023) (Sherwood, 2023), this seems to be now the least likelihood of the possibilities in the near to medium term.

Our priority suggestions on India’s response to safeguard its national interest

We suggest that we will need a mix of three approaches (Pai, 2011), covering our bases from the near to medium and the long-term.

1)       Cautious prudence - In the near term, we will have to focus on shaping outcomes and not constructing them. It is a sensitive situation for India with 20 million Muslim population and shared history of colonialism with Palestine. India will have to adopt and maybe even to some extent steer a multilateral approach, with a focus on reverting to peace & stability in the region, as we continue to nurture our developing relationship with the state of Israel and the Gulf nations alike.

2)       Strategic investments – Our approach on this end will have to be two-pronged – one for the region of Israel and another for directly safeguarding our own interests - and this will need to play out more in the near to medium term.

·        Palestinians are in need of building their own state capacity and institutions. Once the full-scale battles taper down, our support for institutional development in this region (just like we have done in Bhutan and Afghanistan before), will go a long way in creating a peaceful and rules-based order in the middle east, as well as our own standing as a moderate voice of reason between Israel and Palestine.

·        In case of an escalating conflict and both Russia and Israel’s pre-occupation with defending its own citizens and resources, India will need to already prospect and find an alternate defence partner. Our hunt for finding reliable trade partners to help us offset the worries in two of our important trading partners Russia and Israel will be vital – and it is here that increasing trade with the South-East Asian nations could be a vital segway to only safeguard our own interests, but to also get a seat on the table with respect to maritime trade beyond the Indian ocean.

3)       Humanitarian assistance - To the citizens of Gaza and to the citizens of larger Palestine, re-building education, skill and health infrastructure, will go a long way in providing to Gazans the sense of a secure future. This will be a medium-term possibility of intervention, once the dust settles on the ground invasion and the future of Hamas in Gaza.

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