The Manifesto for Zero Slums in India

The Manifesto for Zero Slums in India by 2040

"It is high time to ponder on the future rights on such aspects. We are conscious of the needs of the large cities which require a large amount of migrant work force and recognition of the residential needs of such a workforce. However, this could not mean that valuable lands, either public or private, can be taken away merely because such lands for a long period are permitted to be encroached, throwing to the winds, the elementary adherence of principles of law on the right to property.", said a Mumbai High Court divisional bench in 2024, on hearing a case with respect to the encroachment of private Church land by slum-dwellers in Bandra (PTI, 2024).

This particular quote covers various aspects of the challenges facing our basti/slum-dwellers and the urban planning & regional development of our cities in general. Right from cities becoming unitary magnets for development to no proper planning for this economic development leading to informal settlements housing the poor, and from assimilation into mass-voting blocks for the political parties to the lack of property right often being a Damocles sword keeping the urban poor caught up in a poverty trap.

This Manifesto aims to provide a solution for preventing slums from coming up in the first place—not just redevelopment of existing slums or relocation/re-settlement of existing slum dwellers. This is what remains a blind spot in the Indian context, which is recognising why slums come up in the first place and addressing the root causes of those issues in the medium to long-term.

So, here goes the Manifesto for making India slum-free by 2040.

 

 

 

 

Urban Governance challenges w.r.t. slums (Harish Gupta, 2018), (Arimah, 2010),	Existing policy framework	Main area of intervention
High population and migration density in select cities (stretching the already depleted infrastructure)	Smart City and Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation	Regional Development Hubs - Smart Regions instead of just call 'Smart Cities'
Rising inequality and poverty of the urban poor, who migrate away from a depleting agriculture sector but into another maze of lack of opportunities in the urban areas	Unemployment initiatives focused on villages/rural areas with a NREGA	Urban livelihood programs - To begin with, focused on the small towns and intermediate cities - so that the big city infrastructure is not stretched anymore.
No security of tenure in informal and unorganised housing for the urban poor currently living in slums, shanties, squatter colonies etc	Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana, as a subsidy for building house on one's own land (but does not address the challenge of the land-less, ownership-less majority) (Kundu, 2012)	Land management policy reforms - Making the Awas Yojana kind of subsidy schemes as a part of the larger structural "Zero Slum" challenge for the nation
The highest non-utilised land parcels in cities is found across the Indian ones (Patrick Lamson Hall, 2020)	No established policy framework to address non-use of public land	Simplifying and prioritising land-usage patterns
The lack of supporting public services and infrastructure limits the expansion of cities spatially, and leads to excessive crowding in limited vicinities of opportunities in the city (Sanganal, 2020)	Siloed interventions across various para-statal departments which address transport, water, power etc, separately	Urban infra and service delivery improvement through the right partnerships
A century-old colonial hangover trap or of the idea of cities to today's idea of patrons driving the catchment area for political parties for mass votes in cities, keep them in a constant state of paralysis	Currently heavily dependent on an informal economy of patrons who help represent and solve issues for the slum-dwellers	Addressing head-on the path dependence issues of the marginalised and the historical baggage of the development of the cities

 

 

Main area of intervention	Actions to be taken	Potential pushbacks that would need to be addressed
Regional Development Hubs – ‘Smart Regions’, instead of just call 'Smart Cities'	1) Planning of overnight shelters and dorms for those young into their migration journey / transitioning 2) India urgently needs to promote and develop new towns, small towns, and intermediate cities, along with "counter-magnet city development." (Mathur, 2024) 3) Regional development strategies were none have existed before, are now critical.	The least resistance on this, as Smart City is caught up anyway in basic infrastructure upgrades in path-dependant cities (Singh, 2023)- while the more effective route will be to do it ground-up in newer and developing towns, where the openness and feasibility of carrying out projects anew will be existent.
Urban livelihood programs - To begin with, focused on the small towns and intermediate cities - so that the big city infrastructure is not stretched anymore.	1) Skilling and apprenticeship program with the companies getting special concessions to relocate such smaller towns or intermediate cities. 2) Important need for development of "Kaarigars Community" or clubs, in which cross-learning of skills can happen. These can begin as an invited space, enabled by the state machinery and on gathering a critical velocity can become invented communities. 3) On the lines of a NREGA for villages, a NREGA for these smaller cities can do wonders in engaging workforce in the growth in the construction, real estate, public infrastructure facilities segments of newer urban areas.	The re-allocation of livelihood welfare schemes being rural and developing new urban areas will need to be done efficiently - with the narrative of a better life, better neighbourhoods, away from the concrete jungles of the city and yet much better than their village lives - this has to be done in a mission campaign mode, taking everyone along.
Land management policy reforms - Making the Awas Yojana kind of subsidy schemes as a part of the larger structural "Zero Slum" challenge for the nation	1) Indian cities have the lowest FSI/FAR of all global cities (Dhar, 2023) - leading to artificial escalation in prices of available houses, commercial establishments as the real estate players have to get the same returns from a potential 1/5th of the available constructed space - resolving this is the lowest hanging fruit for utilising best the under-developed land parcels in urban areas and cities. Also, this Manifesto suggests not to carry out the FSI increase in city-centers (which has been the clarion call of many urban economists), but to do it more beyond the city-centre, which can help the general public infrastructure and transportation connectivity also support the increase in population density which follows an FSI increase (which the heart of our cities can no longer sustain) 2) No amount of affordable or low-income housing will solve the problem of slums (Patricia Clarke Annez, 2010) as "most schemes (for low-income/affordable housing), rarely cross the realm of political rhetoric and numbers who benefit are always far too small" (Rao, 2011). So, another low hanging fruit is to send start looking at utilising un-used flats even in medium to income high areas - using the rent model to spread the density will be valuable, and "emphasising access over ownership" (Dhar, 2023) will be critical, to take the burden off housing only meaning ownership, for those living on the margins. 3) Parallel focus on public transportation and other urban infrastructure elements is mandatory - "the transportation needs of a city should address the safety and connectivity concerns of the poorest residents, which can expand the choices that people have regarding where to live and work" (Dr. Abir Bandyopadhyay, 2013)- more on that in Points below 4) Development of mixed neighbourhood is critical, to avoid spatial inequality that creates further poverty traps of ghettos with no or less access to basic amenities. Creating cluster of low to high income housing in same neighbourhoods, addressed head on the problem of public amenities standards.	Pushback from affluent neighbourhoods on the concept of "mixed neighbourhoods" (Dhar, 2023). With reduced FSI/FAR, they will also have their individual accommodation value go down, with the area in general seeing more construction and more overall value - but less value per unit of households - and the urban upper class has anyway been the least dependant on public amenities, so any improvements on that will also not be an added benefit for them. The solutions to this will not be simple – as although the ones being affected will be a smaller community, but will also be a more vocal community.
Simplifying and prioritising land-usage patterns	1) Simplifying the procedure for land use and land ownership is critical to enable shift of land-use patterns with fear, favours, rent-seeking, cost escalation and time delays beyond human comprehension. Along with this, "zoning constraints that interfere with household decisions also leads to slum formation" (Tiago Cavalcanti, 2019). hence relaxing individual household size norms is critical and the focus for any new affordable housing has to be more on the public or shared services (Patricia Clarke Annez, 2010) 2) Un-utilised govt land, most of which is not in dispute, but is held in some of the prime real estate of a city can be freed up 3) Tapping into the "Night Economy" (Dhar, 2023) of the cities and urban areas is important to ensure higher net utilisation of fixed assets around the clock - cities with a history of being safe and secure for women and vulnerable travellers can be the first ones to jump on this shift and lead by example.	Bureaucratic control and power will weaken, and we could face a pushback from them. Incentivising bureaucracy (low to medium level) to enable this transition will be critical - their growth, promotions etc can be linked back to these performances in a competitive environment (on the lines of the China poverty trap escape model (Ang, 2016)).
Urban infra and service delivery improvement through the right partnerships	1) Embracing private "social impact" (Fusaro, 2009) investment into development of infrastructure for the poorer sections of urban localities is critical to ensure that reasonable priced material as well as ladder-pricing of services can be availed of, basis need, by the urban poor - this can bring about a "dramatic increase in capital directed towards combating the growth of slums and making meaningful impact" (Fusaro, 2009) 2) An innovative area, where the urban infrastructure can be maximised at the least cost is by tapping into the Green Energy transition for such development projects - ranging across solar lights, roof rain water harvesting, aggregate waste collection mechanism in dense localities etc - "such projects (can have) local committees carry out work" (United Nations Climate Change, 2023) of such micro-development for the infrastructure of their own localities 3) Municipal institutions are to be given further teeth in piloting dynamic revenue collection models across areas for service delivery in areas of water, power, drainage, public transportation, medical and school facilities – for our cities to be able to decide themselves and invest back into their local poor living dynamics improvement.	Social impact investment will flow in if they see living standards and conditions improving basis govt. CAPEX support - more like a chicken & egg situation, where the govt. too would require champion investors to lead by example along with them. Can't all be "socialisation of risk, privatisation of reward" (Mazzucato, 2018)
Addressing head-on the path dependence issues of the marginalised and the historical baggage of development of the cities	1) Ghettoisation of marginalised to be addressed through not just legislative means but also that getting-together of civil society, citizen groups and RWA's to start breaking down these barriers of exclusion - "people living in slums often feel isolated and disconnected from the mainstream society, and they are more vulnerable to social exclusion and discrimination" (Faster Capital, 2024) 2) Utilising the already existing competitive spirit of development between political party representatives and patrons existing across slums, in giving them a more formalised and structured on-boarded role 3) The catchment area for political parties for mass votes, which leads to extensive focus on slums re-development or re-designing, and spending much of our resources in making sense of the challenges of their lives within the slums rather than thinking from a fresh perspective of how the cities and urban areas itself can be re-designed and planned in ways that the slums do not mushroom in the first place.	Political resistance against letting go of mass scale votes will be very high - and that is why it will be futile to do only this, without bringing about structural changes mentioned in the points above.

 

 

The table below has further details on the implementation dynamics of this Zero Slum Plan.

 

ANNEXURE 1 – DEEP-DIVE INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION DYNAMICS OF THE ZERO SLUM PLAN FOR INDIA 2040

Main area of intervention	Additional budget required	Potential Impact on Zero Slum vision	Political feasibility	Time frame of implementation
Regional Development Hubs - Smart Regions instead of just call 'Smart Cities'	Medium (transfer Smart City budget, into Smart Region schemes - focusing around the main slum / urbanisation clusters of the country)	High	High	Medium term 7-10 yrs
Urban livelihood programs - To begin with, focused on the small towns and intermediate cities - so that the big city infrastructure is not stretched.	Low (With small towns and nearby cities being developed, NREGA re-allocation to be done between rural & urban)	High	High	Near term 3-5yrs
Land management policy reforms - Making the Awas Yojana kind of subsidy schemes as a part of the larger structural "Zero Slum" challenge for the nation	None (transfer Awas Yojana budget into the structural change on Zero Slum Project)	Medium	Medium	Near term 3-5yrs
Simplifying and prioritising land-usage patterns	None (we free up the economy, to be tapped into and optimised by private market forces)	High	Medium	Near term 3-5yrs
Urban infra and service delivery improvement through the right partnerships	None (social impact private investment maximised + municipalities given teeth for revenue generation in the dense urban clusters)	Medium	High (Private social investments) Medium (Municipal Reforms)	Medium term 7-10 yrs
Addressing head-on the path dependence issues of the marginalised and the historical baggage of development of the cities	None (Existing informal & unorganised mechanisms to be leveraged in a formal way)	Medium	Low	Long term 15yrs

 

Bibliography

Ang, Y. Y. (2016). How China escaped the poverty trap. New York: Cornell University Press.

Arimah, B. C. (2010). The Face of Urban Poverty - Explaining the Prevalence of Slums in Developing Countries. United Nations University - World Institute for Development Economic Research.

Dhar, D. (2023). Urban Equity : Bridging the Infrastructure Deficit. In D. Dhar, India's Blind Spot : Understanding and Managing our Cities (pp. 140-150). Gurugram: Harper Collins.

Dr. Abir Bandyopadhyay, V. A. (2013). Slums In India: From Past To Present. International Refereed Journal of Engineering and Science (IRJES), 55-59.

Faster Capital. (2024, April 19). Retrieved from Faster Capital: https://fastercapital.com/content/Urban-slums--Urban-Slums-and-the-Dark-Side-of-Industrialization.html

Fusaro, K. C. (2009). Combating the Growth of Slums Using For‐Profit Social Business Models. Center for Real Estate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Harish Gupta, S. S. (2018). Sustainable Development: A Key to achieve Slum free Cities in India. IJRAR- International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews, 87-99.

Kundu, A. (2012, October 24). London School of Economics. Retrieved from https://blogs.lse.ac.uk: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2012/10/24/the-challenges-of-making-indian-cities-slum-free-part-1/

Mathur, O. P. (2024). Regional Development Planning and Management in Asia : A Restrospective and Prospective Review. In O. P. Mathur, Changing paradigms of urbanisation - India and beyond (p. 230). CSEP.

Mazzucato, M. (2018). The Entrepreneurial State : Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. Penguin .

Patricia Clarke Annez, A. B. (2010). Working with the market : Approach to reducing urban slums in India. The World Bank.

Patrick Lamson Hall, H. A. (2020, December 03). First Post. Retrieved from https://www.firstpost.com: https://www.firstpost.com/india/indian-cities-may-not-be-sprawling-but-their-density-is-a-major-concern-especially-in-a-pandemic-9076071.html

PTI. (2024, June 12). https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/. Retrieved from Economic Times: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/maharashtra-governments-slum-policy-strange-as-it-encourages-encroachments-its-inspection-required-says-hc/articleshow/110942721.cms?from=mdr

Rao, P. (2011, October 08). Retrieved from Indian Express: https://indianexpress.com/article/news-archive/web/slums-need-to-be-prevented-rather-than-cured/

Sanganal, D. A. (2020, May 26). Deccan Herald. Retrieved from https://www.deccanherald.com: https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/slums-are-congested-vulnerable-spaces-841799.html

Singh, G. (2023, August 20). New Indian Express. Retrieved from https://www.newindianexpress.com: https://www.newindianexpress.com/business/2023/Aug/20/where-have-all-the-smart-cities-gone-2606941.html

Tiago Cavalcanti, D. D. (2019). On the Determinants of Slum Formation. The Economic Journal, 1971-1991. Retrieved from Keynes Fund: https://www.keynesfund.econ.cam.ac.uk/projects/gray-zones-causes-and-consequences-slums

United Nations Climate Change. (2023). https://unfccc.int/. Retrieved from UNFCC: https://unfccc.int/climate-action/momentum-for-change/activity-database/momentum-for-change-towards-vibrant-green-urban-slums

 

Re-thinking the appointment of judges in India

Re-thinking the process of appointment of judges in India

Applicable for High Court and Supreme Court judges

Overview of the approach taken

The approach to solving the judicial appointments requires us to do away with linking our decision-making to which institution do we trust more—the judiciary or the executive, or if we see deeper “dangers emerging from a lack of judicial independence or a lack of judicial accountability.” (Madhav Khosla, 2019). These black and white lines have been attempted to be stretched grey in the proposal below.

 

The essence of how the reform proposal will play out

Central to my proposal is a 4:2 panel, with balanced representation of the judiciary and the executive, yet ensuring primacy of the judiciary. The proposed Judicial Appointment Body (JAB) ¹ would look like this

·       Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

·       Three senior-most judges (in terms of tenure) of the Supreme Court

·       Prime Minister

·       Leader of the Opposition ²

(On why it would work) This directly addresses the concerns raised in the Fourth Judges case of the NJAC Act (2015) ³, ensuring the 'primacy' and 'independence' of the judiciary is not compromised ^{4 5 6}.

In the event of a tie, the President assumes the crucial role of the final decision-maker for the JAB. His final decision, made after thorough consultation (not necessarily concurrence) with the Chief Justice, ensures a fair and balanced outcome, instilling confidence in the process. This means that it is not just the two members of the executive who will be sufficient to overturn a decision, which was the case in the proposal of the NJAC Act, which permitted a person not to be appointed as a judge if 2 out of the 4 persons of the commission disagreed with the proposal (NDTV, 2016) ⁷  – tilting the scales heavily in favour of the executive ⁸ .

(On why it would work) So, in that spirit, having the President as a tie-breaker in a body in which the judiciary primacy has also been respected before, must indeed be an acceptable step to even the judiciary, The unanimity among the judicial appointees to this body enables the primacy of the judiciary, while also giving a reasonable voice to a dissenting voice also coming from within the judicial appointees into this body resulting in the eventual tie.

 

It is also important to have a detailed “metric-based evaluation” of judge selection is to remove heavily subjective evaluation from the selection process. In cases where meritocracy makes a “junior” judge more deserving of promotion than a “senior” judge, even those decisions can be legitimately taken by the JAB in total transparency and with evidence to back them up ^{9 10}.

(On why it would work) Favouritism and nepotism would be minimized, while meritocracy also encouraged in a process that has historically been shrouded in the mystery of how judges from across generations of the same family get into critical positions of the Courts, how judgements evidently lop-sided are passed and their bench rewarded or even how networks and friendships often lead to appointment and promotion rather than meritocracy ¹¹.

(The challenges it could face, and how to address it) The pushback against this could be on why should such a publicly disclosed selection process exist only for the judiciary, while no other constitutional office would hold such a requirement. My response to this would be that the Supreme Court is the primary guardian of the constitution of the country, and who the citizens look up to help guide and deliver them rights to them – and with this added responsibility, it is important to keep the selection process to such an institution free from any accusations of fear, favour or nepotism.

 

On the element of judicial exclusivity, the question should instead be whether judicial independence (which is a basic feature of the constitution (Singh, 2023)) mandatorily required judicial primacy in the appointment process. Even if we agree to the primacy of the judiciary in the selection process of judges, it must not prevent the government from passing a law which at least has a minority representation of the executive in this process ¹².

(On why it would work) Other authors have also supported this point by contending that if the judges had primacy in decisions, this would also pass the scrutiny under the basic structure doctrine (Aparna Chandra, 2023), and the above proposal factors this into the equation. Madhav Khosla and Ananth Padmanabhan have argued the same when they say that a “more carefully constructed proposal, which may give the judiciary primacy but had a genuine, meaningful role for the executive, would have been very hard for the court to strike down”.

(The challenges it could face, and how to address it) As for ensuring the “independence of the judiciary” completed detached from the executive, it is important to note that the appointment of judges is neither the only way, nor the most important way to ensure its independence ¹³. Hence, it is important for the legitimate arguments for the independence of the judiciary to not get lost in the maze of necessity on the complete control over the appointment of judges to be the only or even primary way in which they can ensure its independence.

 

It is also important to address the concerns of the existing Collegium that the government “holds” its responses to proposed appointments that it does not agree with. Given the above robust process of checks and balances and deliberation process, we need to have a defined time period of 45 days within which the union government should confirm back to the judiciary on the suggested names, failing which, the proposed names should automatically go through ¹⁴.

 

Eventually, one must remember that judicial primacy must not be interpreted to mean judicial exclusivity– the judiciary being the most pre-eminent should be beyond doubt, but that it is exclusive in authority to all other institutions without any question must not be blindly accepted – and it here that the above-suggested checks and balances to power and authority will help the judiciary itself become (and be perceived as) an even more credible, robust and independent institution ¹⁵.

Endnotes

1)      There are various schools of thoughts which suggest having the bar play a role in the shortlisting process, have a retired judge be a part of the final selection panel, have varied regional representatives embedded into the selection process as also affirmative representation across caste & gender roles – the same has not been added here as suggestions, as I believe that this needs to happen more at the judges selection in the lower courts, to ensure wider, diverse & inclusive participation happens more at the entry-level itself.

 

2)      The representation from both the Council of Ministers and the Opposition ensures a diversity of view across the narrower executive as well as the wider legislature.

 

3)      To understand the persistence of the present Collegium system (Justice, 2021) of the judges’ appointing judges, from 1993 onwards – and not the executive – we would need to acknowledge the series of incidents starting from the 1970s to the early 1990s that laid the foundation for the same (Nariman, 2024) (Aparna Chandra, 2023).

a.       Following the Basic Structure Doctrine judgement, Justice A.N. Ray became the Chief Justice, superseding 3 judges who were part of the majority judgement in the Keshavanada Bharati case (Aparna Chandra, 2023). His attempts at forming a 13-judge bench to overturn Keshavanada Bharati, was another worrying point.

b.       Subsequently, Justice Khanna was superseded as a judge for his dissenting minority judgement against Indira Gandhi in the ADM Jabalpur case during the emergency (SCO Team, 2018).

c.       16 judges when they were transferred by the govt and lost their petition in the court, where the SC said that transferring was completely in the hands of the government.

d.       The First Judge case on the confirmation and transfer of judges, in which the judges again decided that it is the govt alone that would be the final decision maker. The primacy of the Chief Justice was struck down yet again.

e.       The Rajiv Gandhi government would also appoint acting Chief Justices to the High Court if those justices confirmed the government’s nominees to the High Court (Aparna Chandra, 2023).

f.        In the year 1987, we then had the Desai Law Commission Report, in which a Judicial Appointment Commission was proposed of 11 members including 8 from the judiciary across union, high court and retired judges (Nariman, 2024). This didn't come to life eventually, but the grounds for a future NJAC were already laid down.

g.       In 1993, the Second Judges bench of 9 judges doubted the correctness of the First Judges bench, in which the courts finally recognised that the Executive was abusing its power of judicial appointments. And this finally led to the Collegium formation and the advisory opinion in Third Judges case, wherein consultation was considered as concurrence for the Chief Justice and his senior judges along with him.

4)       This also addresses the concerns of the Supreme Court and other legal luminaries against having the representative litigant of the Union Govt. of India (i.e. the Law Minister) a member of this body, which was raised as an objection against the NJAC Act.

 

5)      While talking about the existing Collegium, we must also recognise that an important and immediate precursor to the final selection process is the shortlisting and screening of the pool of the judges for this exercise. My suggestion here is to have the Collegium in its existing form continue with the “screening & shortlisting” process, which would feed into the final deliberations of the JAB to finalise the judges. This will prevent a repeat of the previous incidents of tussles between the judiciary as usual suggesting names, and the executive on and off also attempting to put in its own proposed names into the pool of the shortlist (Nariman, 2024).

 

6)      This model ensures sufficient checks and balances of power between the executive and judiciary. Conflict of interest possibilities between the executive and judiciary are also reduced by not having a Law Minister in the appointment body and by ensuring that even within the executive, adequate balance is maintained between the leading and opposition parties.

7)       And this four-member commission would have had 1 union minister and 2 nominated members.

 

8)      It is important to note that this is in line with what the Constituent Assembly had also debated and what Dr Ambedkar himself had called out as the final power resting with the executive and not the judiciary (Indian Union Debate 2015 - Should the collegium system of judges’ appointments be abolished?, 2016).

 

9)       Most importantly, in the Second Judges judgement, these criteria have been laid out, for the evaluation process of the judges (Dushyant Dave, 2024). So, this proposal formalises this suggestion.

 

10)    The JAB’s transparency is also a cornerstone of this proposal. The minutes of the JAB, a key decision-making body, should be readily available to the public, and a detailed metric-based account of judge selection should be published.

 

11)   The well-respected advocate Dushyant Dave has talked about many cases wherein “judges protect each other” on the most evident cases of judicial impropriety (NALSAR University of Law, 2017). Prashant Bhushan too has laid down a framework for such a process of evaluation to be utilised by an independent body, that according to him, should be selecting the judges in an objective manner (Das, 2023) (Bench, 2015).

 

12)    The NJAC (2015), in its spirit (not going by its exact letter and suggestion), would have got India in line with 80% of the former or current commonwealth countries, in having a commission for judicial appointment (Aparna Chandra, 2023) (Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, 2015).

 

13)    There are many other more critical ways like the importance of “the certainty of tenure, protection from removal from office on arbitrary grounds, protection of salaries and immunity from scrutiny in the discharge of judicial duties except in the case of misconduct” (Aparna Chandra, 2023).

 

14)    The Third Judges bench of 1990 had already suggested a six-week timeline for the govt to respond to the judiciary's proposal. This must be implemented now. This went to 12-16 weeks on the upper end for high court judge appointments and any to and fro in the decision-making process (Nariman, 2024).

 

15)   After we have had three recent cases from the decade of the 2010s of the CJI trampling upon the first principle of natural justice: Nemo judex in sua causa i.e.no person shall be a judge in their own case (Dev, 2019); the checks & balances are as important for the judiciary as much for the executive and legislature, and it is my assertion that along with existing internal institutional checks within the judiciary, the other pillars also need to have a strong and formal say in ensuring there is an external check on the judiciary.

Bibliography

Aparna Chandra, S. K. (2023). People like us : Diversity (or lack thereof) in Judicial appointments. In S. K. Aparna Chandra, Court on trial : A data-driven account of the Supreme Court of India (p. 87). Gurugram: Penguin Random House India.

Bench, B. &. (2015, October 16). NJAC: Independence does not mean that judges must appoint judges”, Prashant Bhushan. India: Bar & Bench. Retrieved from https://www.barandbench.com/news/njac-independence-does-not-mean-that-judges-must-appoint-judges-prashant-bhushan

Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law. (2015). The Appointment, Tenure and Removal of Judges under Commonwealth Principles - A Compendium and Analysis of Best Practices. London: Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law.

Das, A. (2023, January 27). Collegium System Better Than Govt Appointing Judges; But It Is Non-Transparent, Non-Objective & Riddled With Nepotism : Prashant Bhushan. India. Retrieved from https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/better-than-govt-appointing-but-not-transparent-or-objective-riddled-with-nepotism-prashant-bhushan-220012

Desk, I. T. (2023, January 25). India Today. Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in/: https://www.indiatoday.in/law/story/centre-vs-collegium-how-judges-are-appointed-in-india-us-uk-and-other-countries-2326456-2023-01-25

Dev, A. (2019, July 01). Caravan Magazine. Retrieved from https://caravanmagazine.in/: https://caravanmagazine.in/law/what-judiciary-done-itself

Dushyant Dave, P. B. (2024, June 12). "Should Judges Enter Politics?". (K. Sibal, Interviewer) Retrieved from https://youtu.be/2JBKF7TGYgo?si=uh5dEegtAFLuBKJW

Indian Union Debate 2015 - Should the collegium system of judges’ appointments be abolished? (2016). India. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IyaamK2lTuk

Justice, D. o. (2021, August 11). Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of India. Retrieved from https://doj.gov.in/: https://doj.gov.in/memorandum-of-procedure-of-appointment-of-supreme-court-judges/

Madhav Khosla, A. P. (2019). The Supreme Court. In P. B. Devesh Kapur, Re-thinking public institutions in India (p. 114). New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

NALSAR University of Law. (2017, July 18). 'Independence of Judiciary and Judicial appointments' | Mr. Dushyant Dave. India. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YiqRt9YsYhQ

Nariman, J. R. (2024, May). If You're Too Good & Independent, You're Out. India: Live Law.

NDTV. (2016). SC strikes down NJAC: Is it a setback to judicial accountability? Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W9IZyDtUpBY

SCO Team. (2018, March 10). Supreme Court Observer. Retrieved from https://www.scobserver.in/: https://www.scobserver.in/journal/number-of-times-the-senior-most-judge-was-not-appointed-the-cji/

Singh, M. P. (2023). The Union Judiciary. In M. P. Singh, V N Shukla's Constitution of India (p. 464). Lucknow: Eastern Book Company.